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Anxiety can be distracting, disruptive, and incapacitating. Despite problems with empirical
replication of this phenomenon, one fruitful avenue of study has emerged from
working memory (WM) experiments where a translational method of anxiety induction
(risk of shock) has been shown to disrupt spatial and verbal WM performance.
Performance declines when resources (e.g., spatial attention, executive function) devoted
to goal-directed behaviors are consumed by anxiety. Importantly, it has been shown
that anxiety-related impairments in verbal WM depend on task difficulty, suggesting that
cognitive load may be an important consideration in the interaction between anxiety
and cognition. Here we use both spatial and verbal WM paradigms to probe the effect
of cognitive load on anxiety-induced WM impairment across task modality. Subjects
performed a series of spatial and verbal n-back tasks of increasing difficulty (1, 2, and
3-back) while they were safe or at risk for shock. Startle reflex was used to probe
anxiety. Results demonstrate that induced-anxiety differentially impacts verbal and spatial
WM, such that low and medium-load verbal WM is more susceptible to anxiety-related
disruption relative to high-load, and spatial WM is disrupted regardless of task difficulty.
Anxiety impacts both verbal and spatial processes, as described by correlations between
anxiety and performance impairment, albeit the effect on spatial WM is consistent
across load. Demanding WM tasks may exert top-down control over higher-order cortical
resources engaged by anxious apprehension, however high-load spatial WMmay continue
to experience additional competition from anxiety-related changes in spatial attention,
resulting in impaired performance. By describing this disruption across task modalities,
these findings inform current theories of emotion–cognition interactions and may facilitate
development of clinical interventions that seek to target cognitive impairments associated
with anxiety.
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INTRODUCTION
Anxiety disorders are more prevalent than any other mental
health disorder, composing the majority of lifetime mental health
disorders worldwide (Kessler et al., 2009). Given this, the study of
anxiety is a critical public health issue because it places a con-
siderable emotional, social, and financial burden on both the
individual and society as a whole. Along with the emotional facets
of the disorder, anxiety patients have difficulty concentrating and
report feeling distracted, which in turn can negatively impact
their job performance and interpersonal relationships. One pop-
ular hypothesis is that working memory (WM) plays a key role
in the cognitive problems experienced by anxious people by lim-
iting resources necessary to perform goal-directed tasks (Eysenck
and Calvo, 1992; Eysenck, 1998; Shackman et al., 2006; Vytal et al.,
2012). Despite difficulties with replicating anxiety-related impair-
ment in the lab (Fales et al., 2008; Porcelli et al., 2008; Qin et al.,
2009) WM capacity and performance is shown to be significantly
reduced in patient populations (Lucas et al., 1991; Boldrini et al.,
2005) and individuals with trait anxiety (Darke, 1988; Eysenck,
1998). WM is central to healthy functioning because it supports
online maintenance and manipulation of information (e.g., car-
rying on a conversation, or tallying the cost of a grocery bill while
shopping). Cognitive disruption in anxiety is thought, in part, to
reflect the presence of an attentional bias (Robinson et al., under
review), where anxiety takes the reins of certain sensory, percep-
tual, and attentional processes, and threatening information is
preferentially processed over other potentially important infor-
mation (for a meta-analytic review of attentional bias in anxiety
see Bar-Haim et al., 2007).
Anxiety’s influence on behavior encompasses changes in early
perceptual processes as well as changes in higher-order cogni-
tive processes later downstream. Anxiety alters early sensory-
perceptual processes in the auditory (Cornwell et al., 2007) and
visual system (Lim et al., 2009; Shackman et al., 2011) that may
serve to promote threat detection (e.g., detection of auditory
tones or visual cues), and this garnering of resources extends
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into cognitive-affective biases that are manifested in behavior.
Examples of this are found in studies where negatively valenced
stimuli are processed more rapidly under anxious conditions
(Robinson et al., 2011, 2012). However, this bias may be detri-
mental to other goal-directed behaviors that are not threat-
relevant. As such, performance on tasks that involve attention,
maintenance of information, and rapid sensory perception may
be impaired.
Further impairment may result from additional competi-
tion for resources, this time at the level of executive processes.
There are several theories [e.g., processing efficiency (Eysenck
and Calvo, 1992), two-component model (Vytal et al., 2012),
and hemispheric asymmetry hypothesis (Shackman et al., 2006)]
that have built upon this basic premise, and although they are
not necessarily mutually exclusive, they make different predic-
tions about the influence of anxiety on cognition. One important
distinction that underlies each of these theories is that anxi-
ety can be described by both anxious arousal (e.g., physiological
changes in heart-rate variability and eccrine responses, increased
vigilance, and priming of other sensory-dependent defensive
mechanisms) and anxious apprehension (e.g., awareness of phys-
iological changes, worry, and rumination) (Heller et al., 1997).
These two components rely on separable neural systems (Nitschke
et al., 1999). In a similar vein, although verbal and spatial WM
share many neural resources, they also engage separable neural
systems, some of which overlap with the systems above [e.g., anx-
ious apprehension and verbal WM engage dorsal, medial, and
ventral prefrontal cortex (PFC) (D’Esposito et al., 1998; Kalisch
et al., 2006; Engels et al., 2007; Paulesu et al., 2010), anxious
arousal and spatial WM engage unique regions in middle and
ventral PFC (Clark et al., 2003; Dalton et al., 2005; Silk et al.,
2010), for a meta-analysis of spatial and verbal WM neuroimag-
ing studies see Owen et al., 2005]. As such, although both com-
ponents of anxiety (anxious apprehension and anxious arousal)
are likely to affect any type of WM, they may differentially dis-
rupt verbal and spatial WM. Specifically, anxious apprehension
and anxious arousal may preferentially disrupt verbal and spatial
WM, respectively. This is because verbalWM processes may share
more neural circuitry with anxious apprehension (e.g., mecha-
nisms involved in verbal information encoding and verbal-based
worry) and spatial WM may share more neural circuitry with
anxious arousal (e.g., mechanisms involved in spatial attention).
Based exclusively on the anxious apprehension component,
processing efficiency theory proposes that anxious worry reduces
WM capacity in general by competing for executive resources;
the greater the worry and the more difficult the task, the greater
the disruption (Eysenck and Calvo, 1992). This claim is based on
the proposal that worry reduces decreases processing efficiency
and increases the amount of effort necessary to perform a task.
Increased effort is reflected in increased RT, not performance
impairment. Alternatively, the two-component model claims that
anxious apprehension disrupts WM performance accuracy, and
that this disruption is greatest when WM tasks are easy because
there are free resources for anxious apprehension to engage.
Further, the two-component model proposes a differential effect
of anxiety on verbal versus spatial WM based on competition
for a separate combination of resources. The assertion is that
high-load verbalWM impairment abolishes the impact of anxiety
by engaging top-down emotional control mechanisms (similar to
those involved in explicit emotion regulation). In contrast, high-
load spatial WM impairment persists, in part because of resource
competition with the priming of defensive mechanisms (e.g.,
perceptual sensitivity, autonomic arousal), which unlike anxious
apprehension is sustained regardless of WM load. Finally, others
(Shackman et al., 2006) have proposed that anxiety uniquely dis-
rupts spatial WM performance accuracy, because task-irrelevant
anxious arousal components and spatial WM processes compete
for resources in the right PFC and other more posterior regions
(e.g., intraparietal sulcus, posterior parietal cortex). Support for
all three theories has been found (see Eysenck and Calvo, 1992)
for a review of support for processing efficiency, Vytal et al., 2012
for support of the two component model, and Lavric et al., 2003;
Shackman et al., 2006 for findings in line with the hemispheric
asymmetry proposal, however, no single study has ever directly
compared support for all three theories by combining both task
modality (i.e., spatial and verbal) and cognitive load (i.e., task dif-
ficulty). Previous research has come close (Shackman et al., 2006),
but psychometric differences in low-load tasks prevented explicit
evaluation of these two factors.
Recently, a pivotal study on the impact of anxiety on verbal
WM processes has provided findings that implicate a central role
for cognitive load in the interplay between anxiety and cognition
(Vytal et al., 2012). Using n-back tasks of varying difficulty dur-
ing periods of threat (shock) and safety (no shock), the authors
found that performance was impaired by anxiety, but only when
the task was easy or moderately challenging. When the task was
difficult, anxiety was reduced, and performance did not differ
between threat and safe conditions. As the first study to show
that verbal WM is impaired by anxiety under low cognitive
load, and that high-load verbal WM reduces anxiety, it high-
lights the importance of considering cognitive load in the study of
emotion–cognition interactions. Together with key findings that
suggest high-load spatial WM is susceptible to anxiety-related
impairment (Shackman et al., 2006), these results indicate that
although anxiety disrupts both verbal and spatial WM, the pres-
ence or degree of disruption is a function of both task modality
and cognitive load. Studies that use a translational method of
anxiety induction (threat of electric shock, used in conjunction
with a no-shock safety condition) find robust anxiety-related
performance deficits (Robinson et al., under review). Such stud-
ies have found that verbal (Vytal et al., 2012) and spatial WM
(Lavric et al., 2003; Shackman et al., 2006) are impaired by anx-
iety, yet only low-load verbal WM is susceptible to disruption,
whereas spatial WM is disrupted under high cognitive load. Thus,
at 3-back, there is equitable performance under threat and safety
when the task involves verbal stimuli, and impaired performance
under threat, when the task involves spatial stimuli. However, it
is unknown whether or not low-load spatial WM tasks are sus-
ceptible to disruption, and whether there is a differential impact
of anxiety on verbal and spatial WM across a varying of cogni-
tive load. In this study we sought to tease apart the impact of
anxiety on both verbal and spatial WM, and determine whether
or not task difficulty plays a role in this disruption. By deter-
mining the precise profile of WM impairment in anxiety, we will
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have a more comprehensive understanding of anxiety’s impact on
cognition. This knowledge can then be used to target the aber-
rant mechanisms that disrupt cognitive processes in pathological
anxiety.
In the current experiment, threat of shock was used to induce
sustained anxiety, and anticipatory anxiety was measured using
acoustic startle reflex (eye blink) and subjective ratings. The star-
tle reflex is an effective index of anxiety because it is robustly
potentiated under anxious conditions, and this potentiation
is thought to reflect priming of defense mechanisms in both
humans and non-human animals (Davis, 1998; Grillon, 2002).
On two separate sessions, participants performed a series of ver-
bal and spatial n-back tasks of varying difficulty (1-back, 2-back,
and 3-back) under threat and safe (no shock) conditions. Based
on evidence that suggests low and medium-load verbal WM
(Vytal et al., 2012) and other low-load tasks are disrupted by
anxiety (Lavie, 2005) (but in opposition to the processing effi-
ciency theory and the hemispheric asymmetry hypothesis), we
predicted that both verbal and spatial low-load and medium-load
WM (i.e., 1-back and 2-back) would be impaired under threat
versus safe conditions. Here, we define impairment as a decrease
in performance accuracy. However, we predicted that high-load
spatial WM but not verbal WM would be affected by anticipa-
tory anxiety (i.e., performance would be impaired during threat
compared to safe conditions). These hypotheses are based on pre-
vious findings and predictions from both the two-component
model and hemispheric asymmetry hypothesis that suggest high-
load verbal and spatial WM are differentially impacted by anxiety.
Finally, we predicted that individual differences in state anxi-
ety (as indexed by anxiety potentiated startle and state anxiety
ratings) would be negatively correlated with individual differ-
ences in performance, indicating that greater anxiety is associated
with greater anxiety-related cognitive impairment. Along these
same lines, we predicted that anxiety-potentiated startle would
be positively correlated with anxiety (consistent with the claim
that startle potentiation indexes anxiety). These predictions were
all based on previous research suggesting that individual differ-
ences in anxiety predict impairment and startle potentiation is
a robust index of anxiety (Shackman et al., 2006; Vytal et al.,
2012). In summary, we expected that anxiety would differentially
impact verbal versus spatial WM across increasing levels of cogni-
tive load, such that (1) anxiety induction would impair lower-load
(1-back and 2-back) but not higher-load (3-back) verbal WM,




Twenty-seven healthy individuals (13 males) received monetary
compensation for their participation in the study. Participants
were recruited for the study via online resources, paper flyers,
and advertisements placed in local newspapers. Upon arrival, par-
ticipants completed an intake evaluation consisting of a brief
physical exam, urine screen, and a Structured Clinical Interview
for DSM-IV (SCID; First et al., 1995). Exclusion was based
on the following criteria: (1) past or current psychiatric disor-
der(s), (2) contraindicated medical condition, and (3) use of
psychoactive medications or illicit drugs. Three participants were
excluded because of equipment failure. The final group of partic-
ipants consisted of 24 adults (11 males; mean age 29.5 years; age
range: 18–46 years). Subjects provided written informed consent
that was approved by the Combined Neuroscience Institutional
Review Board of the National Institutes of Health.
STIMULI AND APPARATUS
All visual stimuli were presented on a PC using Presentation®
software (Version 0.70, www.neurobs.com). Presentation® soft-
ware was also used to control all electric shocks and startle
probes via a commercial system (Contact Precision Instruments,
London, United Kingdom). Shocks (up to 5mA and 200ms
duration) were produced by a constant current stimulator and
administered to the median nerve of the left wrist using two 6mm
Ag/AgCl electrodes. Shock level was determined independently
for each participant using a shock workup procedure where the
shock level began at 3.5mA and was increased by increments of
0.2mA until the subject rated the shock as highly uncomfort-
able, but still tolerable (M = 5.9; SD = 2) based on a 1–9 scale
(1, not at all painful, to 9, extremely painful). Acoustic startle
probes [40ms, 103 dB(A), near instantaneous rise/fall times] were
presented binaurally through over-the-ear headphones. The eye
blink reflex was measured using two 6mm Ag/AgCl electrodes
(impedances below 15 k) placed over the orbicularis oculi mus-
cle under the left eye. Electromyographic (EMG) data were
recorded by Psylab 7 software (Contact Precision Instruments,
London, UK).
PROCEDURE
Procedures and task-design were identical to the those described
in (Vytal et al., 2012), with the exception that in the current study,
there were two sessions (counterbalanced order), one for the ver-
bal n-back and the other for the spatial n-back (similar in design
except that the location of a red star in one of four corners of a
diamond was the target, as opposed to a letter). The basic lay-
out was the same across sessions. To assess stable trait anxiety and
experiment-induced state anxiety, all participants completed the
Spielberger state-trait anxiety inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al.,
1983) when they first arrived. Prior to the experiment, partici-
pants practiced all four levels (view, 1-back, 2-back, and 3-back)
of each task (spatial and verbal) to reduce changes in performance
as a result of learning. Participants indicated “same” or “different”
with a keyboard button press based on the stimulus (verbal: let-
ter, spatial: location) 1-back, 2-back, or 3-back from the current
stimulus, or simply attended to the stimuli (“view” task) without
making a response (see Figure 1B for a sample verbal block and
Figure 1C for a sample spatial block). Following practice, par-
ticipants were presented with nine startle probes every 17–20 s
during a rest period in order to habituate initial startle reactivity.
Each session included four experimental runs, consisting of
eight alternating threat and safe blocks (see Figure 1A for a sam-
ple run). Participants were reminded of the condition they were
in [threat (at risk to receive shock) or safe (no shocks were deliv-
ered)] by colored borders (verbal: the word THREAT or SAFEwas
written inside, spatial: a red or blue border, represented threat and
safe, respectively). Each run began with three habituation probes,
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FIGURE 1 | Task run and block structure. (A) Schematic diagram of a
sample run with alternating threat and safe n-back blocks. During each n-back
block, three acoustic probes were delivered. Shocks were delivered three
times during each run (with 0–2 shocks each threat block). (B) Sample verbal
1-back block and internal trial structure. Each block began with an instruction
screen, followed by a fixation cross. Eighteen letters were presented in
succession during each block, separated by a 2 s ITI (fixation). Participants
made a keyboard button press response for every letter presented; one
button indicated a target letter (e.g., “r”) and another button indicated a
distractor letter (e.g., “n” and “R”). During the view condition subjects
attended to the letters without making a button press. (C) Sample spatial
2-back block and internal trial structure. Block structure was identical to the
verbal n-back except that spatial stimuli were used. Participants made a
keyboard button press response every time a star appeared in one of four
locations; one button indicated a target location (e.g., “top”) and another
button indicated a distractor location (e.g., “bottom”).
followed by a 2-s instruction screen (e.g., “1-back”) and a 1000ms
fixation cross. Stimuli (18 in each block; 144 per n-back task; 288
threat, 288 safe) were presented for 500ms each, separated by
2000ms (±250ms) fixation inter-trial intervals (ITIs). All verbal
stimuli were presented in Arial, 48-point font in the center of the
screen. Verbal n-back targets consisted of eight letters (B, F, K,
H, M, Q, X, R), in both upper and lowercase to reduce reliance
on perceptual similarity (as such, “b” and “B” were treated as
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identical targets). The spatial n-back target was a single asterisk,
Arial 64-point font, successively presented in one of the four cor-
ners of a gray diamond (height: 7.5 cm, width: 10.8 cm), centered
in the middle of the screen. During the ITI, twelve shocks (0–2 per
threat block; 3 per run) and nine startle probes (every 17–20 s)
were administered. To reduce sensitization effects of the shocks
on startle, shocks preceded probes by at least 16 s, and followed
probes with a mean latency of approximately 2 s. Shocks were
only delivered during half of the threat blocks to prevent shock
desensitization and to reduce potential effects of the shock itself
(versus anticipation of the shock) on performance and startle.
Blocks were separated by an 8 s inter-block interval.
DATA REDUCTION AND ANALYSIS
EMG data were sampled at 1000Hz, filtered (30–500Hz), recti-
fied, and smoothed with a 20-ms time constant. Startle responses
were defined as the peak magnitude of the eye blink reflex
(20–100ms after stimulus onset) relative to a 50-ms average
baseline that immediately preceded the probe onset. Less than
one percent of trials was excluded based on large baseline arti-
facts. T-score transformation was used to attenuate large inter-
individual differences in raw reflex magnitude. Peak eye blink
magnitudes were T-scored (across all conditions) and averaged
within each condition for each subject. For correlation analyses,
differential accuracy scores (threat–safe) and differential startle
scores (threat–safe) were averaged across 1-back, 2-back, and
3-back blocks, resulting in an aggregate impairment score and
aggregate startle potentiation score for each subject. To confirm
that accuracy did not differ as a result of shock or probe admin-
istration, trials that preceded or followed shocks, and those that
preceded or followed probes were analyzed separately. No differ-
ences were found and all trials were included in the final analysis.
Trials where participants failed to respond before the next stim-
ulus appeared on the screen (i.e., 2500ms post-stimulus onset)
were omitted. However, such omissions were uncommon and
unsystematic. A series of binomial tests at the individual level
confirmed that all participants included in the final analysis per-
formed above chance. Alpha was set at 0.05 for all statistical tests.
Repeated-measures ANOVAs, paired t-tests, and Pearson product
moment correlation coefficients were all used to assess statistical
significance. Greenhouse–Geisser corrections (GG-ε) were used
for repeated-measures ANOVAs that involved factors with three
or more levels.
PSYCHOMETRICS
We sought to examine the impact of anxiety on different modal-
ities of WM (verbal and spatial) as well as different levels of
cognitive load. As such, it was important to investigate psychome-
tric equivalence so that discrete inferences about the differential
effect of anxiety could be made in the absence of a double dis-
sociation (where two or more experimental manipulations have
opposing effects on two ormore dependent variables) (Shackman
et al., 2006). To determine psychometric equivalence we cal-
culated discriminating power (Chapman and Chapman, 2001),
which quantifies the sensitivity of a test to detect an experimental
manipulation (or a group difference) between tasks where dif-
ferences were found (see the results section for a full description
of these findings). Discriminating power was computed by mul-
tiplying the accuracy variance across baseline (safe) runs by the
reliability in accuracy (Cronbach’s coefficient alpha) across those
same runs. Comparison of verbal and spatial n-back discrimi-
nating power at high load (3-back) demonstrated that sensitiv-
ity did not differ between the two tests [t(23) = 1.92, p > 0.05;
M = 33.36 (verbal 3-back), M = 49.25 (spatial 3-back)]. This
is critical because the differential impact of anxiety on cogni-
tive load between verbal and spatial stimuli was present only in
the high-load data. Further, we confirmed that task difficulty was
equivalent between 3-back verbal and spatial WM tasks, [perfor-
mance: t(23) = −1.25, p = 0.226], suggesting that the tasks were
similarly challenging and that impact of threat on 3-back spa-
tial performance cannot be attributed to the fact that it was less
challenging than verbal 3-back. In addition, comparison of verbal
low-load to high-load discriminating power demonstrated that
sensitivity was greater in the high-load task than in the low-load
task [t(23) = 5.39, p < 0.001;M = 33.36 (high-load),M = 12.72
(low-load)]. Given that low-load verbal WM tasks were found to
be less sensitive than high-load verbal WM tasks, anxiety-related





Without verification that our anxiety manipulation was success-
ful, it would be difficult to clearly interpret any performance
differences observed. Anxiety ratings in both studies indicated
that subjects experienced more anxiety when they were at risk
for shock [verbal: threat M = 5.5, safe M = 2.2, t(23) = 7.6,
p < 0.001; spatial: threat M = 5.3, safe M = 2.1, t(23) = 10.1,
p < 0.001]. In addition to self-report, we used startle magni-
tude to verify that threat of shock successfully induced anx-
iety. Startle was consistently potentiated by threat of shock,
F(1, 23) = 67.1, p < 0.0001, η2 = 0.75, confirming the manip-
ulation. Moreover, anxiety-potentiated startle (threat–safe) was
reduced by load [F(3, 69) = 12.7, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.36], indicat-
ing that load decreased anxiety [confirmed by a linear trend:
F(1, 23) = 34.9, p < 0.0001, η2 = 0.60]. Startle did not differ
as function of WM modality [Modality × Anxiety × Load =
F(3, 69) = 1.4, p = 0.252, η2 = 0.06].
Load
To verify that the n-back tasks of varying difficulty resulted
in differing levels of cognitive load (reflected by performance),
a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted across WM task
modalities. The main effect of Load on performance was sig-
nificant, F(2, 46) = 113.0, p < 0.0001, η2 = 0.83, indicating that
regardless of task modality and condition, overall WM perfor-
mance differed across levels of cognitive load. A linear trend
demonstrated that as load increased, performance decreased
[F(1, 23) = 200.3, p < 0.0001, η2 = 0.90], indicating that the
more demanding tasks were in fact more challenging. To inves-
tigate this effect further, the results were considered separately
for verbal and spatial tasks. Both verbal and spatial WM per-
formance was impacted by Load, [F(2, 46) = 50.8, p < 0.0001,
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η2 = 0.69 and F(2, 46) = 50.1, p < 0.0001, η2 = 0.69, respec-
tively], and planned comparisons indicate that as task difficulty
increased, performance was progressively worse [verbal: 2-back
performance was lower than 1-back, t(23) = −3.9, p < 0.002;
and 3-back performance was lower than 2-back, t(23) = −5.8,
p < 0.001, spatial: 2-back performance was lower than 1-back,
t(23) = −4.1, p < 0.001; and 3-back performance was lower than
2-back, t(23) = −8.1, p < 0.001].
PERFORMANCE
Consistent with our predictions, the critical three-way interaction
between Modality, Anxiety, and Load, was significant, F(2, 46) =
3.5, p < 0.04, η2 = 0.13, indicating that anxiety had a differential
impact on overall WM performance across load. To decompose
this interaction, performance data were analyzed separately for
verbal and spatial WM tasks. For verbal WM, the interaction of
Anxiety and Load was significant, F(2, 46) = 6.9, p < 0.003, η2 =
0.23, reflecting the finding that 1-back and 2-back performance
was impaired during threat as compared to safe [t(23) = −2.5,
p < 0.03, and t(23) = −3.1, p < 0.006, respectively], but 3-back
performance did not differ between conditions [t(23) = 1.7, p =
0.101] (see Figure 2). Further, performance differences between
threat and safe (i.e., threat–safe) were greater for 1-back and
2-back tasks as compared to 3-back [t(23) = 2.2, p < 0.05, and
t(23) = 2.3, p < 0.04, respectively]. We confirmed that these find-
ings were not driven by speed and accuracy tradeoffs, with RT
analyses demonstrating that RT did not differ between threat and
safe across Load, F(2, 46) = 0.170, p = 0.845, and more specifi-
cally, RT differences (threat–safe) were not significantly different
between low (1 and 2-back) and high load (3-back) [t(23) = 0.2,
p = 0.857, and t(23) = 0.3, p = 0.741, respectively] (see Table 1
for RT means and standard errors of the mean). These find-
ings suggest that in the case of verbal WM, lower-demand tasks
are susceptible to disruption by induced-anxiety, whereas higher-
demand tasks are not. In contrast to the verbal WM results, there
was not a significant Anxiety × Load interaction for spatial WM,
F(2, 46) = 0.31, p < 0.738, η2 = 0.01. However, there was a sig-
nificant main effect of Anxiety on performance, F(1, 23) = 18.8,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.449, indicating that spatial WM performance
was impaired overall during threat as compared to safe, regard-
less of task difficulty (see Figure 2). This finding indicates that
under both low and high cognitive load, an anxiogenic context
impaired spatial WM. As with verbal WM, we confirmed that RT
did not differ between threat and safe across Load for spatial WM,
F(2, 46) = 2.6, p = 0.085.
Table 1 | Mean reaction time for verbal and spatial working memory
as a function of experimental condition and cognitive load.
1-back 2-back 3-back
VERBAL
Threat 703 (32) 787 (41) 793 (44)
Safe 712 (35) 778 (40) 792 (40)
SPATIAL
Threat 721 (31) 834 (48) 846 (42)
Safe 756 (42) 816 (47) 870 (48)
Note: Standard errors of the mean appear in parentheses to the right of each
mean.
FIGURE 2 | Verbal and spatial n-back performance during threat and
safe. Verbal performance was impaired during threat compared to safe
when participants were engaged in low-load tasks (1-back and 2-back),
but not high-load tasks (3-back). In contrast, spatial performance was
impaired during threat compared to safe when participants were
engaged in any task, irrespective of difficulty. Error bars represent the
within-subjects standard error for the repeated-measures general linear
model (GLM) comparing different levels of Load under threat (dark gray
bars) and safe (light gray bars) conditions separately. Within-subject
standard error was calculated by dividing the square root of the mean
standard error for the GLM divided by the square root of n (Masson,
2003). ∗p < 0.01.
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CORRELATIONS
There was a negative correlation between anxiety-potentiated
startle and differential performance under threat (threat–safe) for
both verbal, r = −0.44, p < 0.04, and spatial WM, r = −0.41,
p < 0.05, demonstrating that increased startle potentiation was
associated with increased WM impairment (see Figure 3 for scat-
terplots). In line with this, there was also a negative correlation
between state anxiety and differential performance under threat
in verbal, r = −0.41, p < 0.05, and spatial WM, r = −0.61, p <
0.01, reinforcing the idea that high levels of anxiety were asso-
ciated with greater verbal WM impairment. Additionally, we
confirmed that anxiety-potentiated startle was a good index of
anxiety (as assessed by state anxiety scores) in both tasks (verbal:
r = 0.66, p < 0.01; spatial: r = 0.47, p < 0.03). Together, these
findings suggest that anxiety is a strong predictor of threat-related
verbal WM impairment.
To further unpack the interaction of Modality and Load on
anxiety-related WM impairments, and to address the prediction
that verbal WM will be more sensitive to parametric modulation
of task difficulty, we subtracted the difference between threat and
safe during high load (performance and startle), from the differ-
ence between threat and safe during low load (performance and
startle) and conducted a correlation analysis. As predicted, we
found that the differential anxiety-potentiated startle scores were
negatively correlated with the differential performance scores
(1-backminus 3-back) for verbalWM (r = −0.58, p < 0.02), but
not spatial WM (r = −0.17, p = 0.44). Moreover, Fisher’s z-test
confirmed that these two correlations were significantly differ-
ent, z = 1.7, p > 0.05. This negative correlation indicates that
the more anxiety-potentiated startle was reduced from 1-back
to 3-back (i.e., indicating reduction in anxiety), the better the
performance improvement was from 1-back to 3-back in threat
FIGURE 3 | The relationship among anxiety-potentiated startle,
performance (threat–safe), and state anxiety. Startle potentiation
was negatively correlated with verbal and spatial working memory
performance, and state anxiety was negatively correlated with
verbal and spatial working memory performance. p < 0.05 for all
correlations.
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versus safe. This suggests that load is an important manipulation
in characterizing the impact of anxiety on verbal WM perfor-
mance, and that it is less critical in characterizing the impact of
anxiety on spatial WM performance.
DISCUSSION
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS
Anxiety helps maintain a state of readiness. It facilitates threat
processing and defensive responding but it also prompts cognitive
changes. Studying these changes using dual-task paradigms may
help to clarify behavioral performance under stress (test anxiety,
decision making/planning in the battlefield or during an emer-
gency) and emotion regulation mechanisms. In addition, this line
of research can identify specific cognitive deficits associated with
anxiety and anxiety disorders. Concerning the latter, the present
study suggests that the cognitive and defensive components of
anxiety interfere with WM tasks but to a different degree, such
that anxious apprehension has more of a domain-general impact
on WM, high-load verbal WM engages top-down control mech-
anisms that abolish anxiety-related disruption, and spatial WM is
more vulnerable to the effects of anxious arousal.
As predicted, induced-anxiety impaired both verbal and spa-
tial WM processes, but anxiety had a different impact on perfor-
mance when cognitive load was considered. Results demonstrate
that low-load verbal WM is more susceptible to anxiety-related
disruption and spatial WM is disrupted regardless of task dif-
ficulty. Well-validated measures of anxiety (state anxiety and
startle potentiation) strongly predicted variability in performance
impairment, underscoring the specificity of these effects. These
novel results provide a framework for understanding the inter-
action between anxiety and two distinct modalities of WM, by
emphasizing the effect of cognitive load on performance. Further,
these findings are in line with the two-component model (Vytal
et al., 2012), which proposes a differential effect of anxiety on ver-
bal versus spatial WM based on competition over two separable
neural circuits [a conceptual distinction that was proposed but
not substantiated in prior work (Shackman et al., 2006)].
INTEGRATION WITH CURRENT THEORIES
While there is clear support for the two-componentmodel of anx-
iety, the processing efficiency theory (Eysenck and Calvo, 1992)
receives only limited support and the hemispheric asymmetry
hypothesis (Shackman et al., 2006) serves as only a partial expla-
nation for these findings. First, our data do not support a key
prediction of processing efficiency theory [and its offshoot, atten-
tional control theory (ACT) (Eysenck et al., 2007)], namely, that
anxious worry increases RT. However, although we did not find
RT differences between any of our conditions, we found perfor-
mance differences in partial support of these theories. Processing
efficiency theory and ACT predict that anxiety impairs high-load
WM is impaired when a subject is anxious, regardless of the
task modality, yet our findings suggest that only spatial WM is
disrupted under high cognitive load. Similarly, the hemispheric
asymmetry hypothesis proposes that processes which rely heav-
ily on the right hemisphere [e.g., spatial attention (Corballis
et al., 2002; Manoach et al., 2004)] are disrupted by anxiety
because anxious arousal consumes right hemisphere resources
(Clark et al., 2003; Dalton et al., 2005). This prediction holds true
to an extent; spatial WM is disrupted by anxiety (Lavric et al.,
2003; Shackman et al., 2006), and it is plausible that this dis-
ruption is the result of competition for shared resources between
spatial attention and automatic priming of defensivemechanisms.
However, there is now ample evidence to suggest that anxiety
also impairs verbal WM (Markham and Darke, 1991; Ikeda et al.,
1996; Vytal et al., 2012), leaving that mechanism of impairment
undefined.
The two-component theory of anxiety fills this explanatory
gap by describing a specific mechanism for verbal WM disrup-
tion. Anxiety, which is comprised of a cascade of physiological
and neural responses, is best characterized by two separable com-
ponents: (1) an anxious apprehension component (Heller et al.,
1997) that engages executive resources and includes anxiety-
related cognitive processes like worry, and (2) an automatic
preparatory response that primes defensive mechanisms (Lang
et al., 1998), increases perceptual sensitivity (Cornwell et al.,
2011), and enhances autonomic arousal (e.g., increases in heart
rate and blood pressure) (Bandura, 1988). Although this distinc-
tion is not new (Heller et al., 1997) the application of such frame-
work to modality-specific WM disruption is novel. The anxious
apprehension component and automatic preparatory component
engage separable neural circuits (Nitschke et al., 1999), and as a
consequence, they have a differentiable impact on processes that
share these same respective neural resources. Established neural
correlates of verbal and spatial WM (D’Esposito et al., 1998) over-
lap with the anxious apprehension and preparatory component
circuitry respectively. With respect to verbal WM (D’Esposito
et al., 1998; Kalisch et al., 2006) and anxious apprehension (Engels
et al., 2007; Paulesu et al., 2010), such regions include bilateral
dorsal, medial, and left ventral PFC, and with respect to spa-
tial WM (Manoach et al., 2004) and the preparatory component
(Clark et al., 2003; Dalton et al., 2005), such regions include right
dorsal/mid and ventral PFC.
Thus, it appears that when anxiety promotes adaptive
responses to threat [e.g., increased heart rate (Bandura, 1988),
potentiation of visual (Shackman et al., 2011) and auditory
perception (Cornwell et al., 2007), amplified attention to emo-
tionally negative stimuli (Robinson et al., 2012)], such changes
commandeer neural resources that are critical to WM mainte-
nance. These resources can be reappropriated by increasing the
demands of a verbal task, in turn reducing anxiety and normal-
izing performance in the face of threat (Rapee, 1993; Vytal et al.,
2012). Of note, both easy (e.g., 1-back) and moderately difficult
(2-back) verbal WM tasks are disrupted by anxiety, indicating
that even when there is partial competition for resources, anx-
iety continues to control shared neural real estate. Only when
task demands increase sufficiently to significantly (or completely)
consume resources, is the effect of anxiety on performance abol-
ished. Top-down emotional control mechanisms and domain-
general WM are mediated by the same neurocognitive mech-
anisms [e.g., lateral PFC (Brodmann area 9) and dorsomedial
PFC (Brodmann area 6); for meta-analytic reviews of WM neu-
roimaging studies see Owen et al., 2005; Nee et al., 2013, for
explicit emotional regulation studies see Ochsner et al., 2004;
Kim and Hamann, 2007; Diekhof et al., 2011], suggesting that
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down-regulation of anxiety may occur through either conscious
or incidental regulation. However, increasing the demand of a
spatial task does not result in normalized performance; accuracy
is still impaired even under high-demand spatial WM mainte-
nance. We propose that there are three potential reasons for this
sustained impairment. First, in line with the hemispheric asym-
metry hypothesis, anxiety shares a greater amount of critical
resources with spatial WM processes [including spatial attention
(Cornwell et al., 2008), perception, and maintenance] and there-
fore has a greater impact on spatial WM. Second, physiological
changes associated with defensive readying (i.e., changes in spa-
tial attention, visual acuity etc.) are more protracted (Bonanno
et al., 1995) and may be less frequently and more circuitously
subject to explicit regulation than cognitive responses to stress
(top-down control of lower-order subcortical processes that pro-
mote survival may be more difficult than cortical control of
other higher-order cortical responses). As a consequence, difficult
spatial WM processes that share critical mechanisms with defen-
sive preparations may continue to be disrupted. Third, although
cognitive load can reduce anxiety and threat-related distraction
(Vytal et al., 2012), defensive mechanisms remain intact under
high load to promote survival, and as a consequence spatial
WM impairment associated with these mechanisms may also
persist.
IMPLICATIONS FOR PATHOLOGY
Clinical anxiety is associated with known disruptions in the cog-
nitive domain, including WM (Lucas et al., 1991; Boldrini et al.,
2005) spatial perception (Jacob et al., 1985; Simon et al., 1998),
and spatial navigation (Cohen et al., 1996; Mueller et al., 2009)
among others. These disruptions, however, are accompanied by
facilitation in related domains, like visual threat detection (Bar-
Haim et al., 2007), which may be supported by modulation of
early sensory processes in anxiety disorders (Morgan III and
Grillon, 1999; Ge et al., 2011). It follows that the greatest neg-
ative impact of this facilitation is on tasks that share resources
with processes that support threat detection (e.g., a spatial WM
task that requires rapid detection and sustained maintenance
of perceptual information). Our findings support this claim,
by demonstrating that anxiety-induction in healthy individu-
als results in robust impairment of spatial WM. These parallels
also validate the use of threat of shock to model pathological
anxiety in healthy individuals (for a review on the similarities
between findings from threat of shock paradigms and patholog-
ical anxiety, see Robinson et al., under review). It is important
to note however, that in addition to changes in spatial attention
and perception, pathological anxiety [in particular, generalized
anxiety disorder (GAD) (Brown et al., 1992)] is also associated
with higher-order cognitive processes like excessive worry that
involve verbally-based changes in thought (Borkovec and Inz,
1990). Here, our findings add additional insight into WMdisrup-
tion; easy verbal WM task performance is impaired by anxiety,
but more difficult verbal tasks result in normalized performance.
These findings have critical implications for understanding the
nature of disruption (as described earlier), detecting anxiety-
related impairment(s), and improving treatment of different
anxiety disorders.
Although anxiety can be viewed as a continuous psycho-
logical construct, with a threshold of severity separating health
and pathology, anxiety disorders are comprised of categorically-
separable manifestations of anxiety, with markedly different
symptom profiles1. GAD, for example, is characterized by exces-
sive worry (Borkovec and Inz, 1990; Brown et al., 1992), whereas
panic disorder (PD) is characterized in terms of somatic symp-
toms that center on cardiovascular changes (Katon, 1984). By
focusing on central symptoms of each patient and identifying
the etiology of such symptoms, appropriate treatment methods
can be better applied. For example, overloading the verbal WM
system is shown to reduce threat-related cognitive distraction
and reduce anxiety-related WM impairments (Vytal et al., 2012).
Techniques like cognitive behavioral therapy can take advan-
tage of this and integrate similar procedures in the treatment of
patients with GAD. On the other hand, individuals with somatic
anxiety symptoms (e.g., PD) may exhibit greater spatial impair-
ments including orientation (Jacob et al., 1985; Simon et al.,
1998) and WM (Boldrini et al., 2005), thus identifying cog-
nitive markers for the disorder. In contrast to overloading the
WM system, effective treatment for PD may include addressing
the somatic aspects of the disorders with pharmacological inter-
ventions that alter noradrenergic function [e.g., imipramine or
alprazolam (Charney et al., 1986)], compounds that selectively
gate communication between amygdala and brainstem known to
support physiological responses to threat [the medial part of the
central nucleus of the amygdala and the dorsal vagal complex
(Viviani et al., 2011)], and therapeutic interventions like progres-
sive relaxation that target somatic symptoms (Davidson, 1978).
STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS
A major strength of the study was the use of a within-subject
design, which increases statistical efficiency (i.e., the ability to
detect an effect), and decreases the potential that group differ-
ences are driven by the individuals that comprise it rather than
the experimental manipulation (because the groups are made
of identical participants). Another advantage of this design was
the use of an anxiety-induction manipulation where (1) subjects
could serve as their own controls and (2) the emotional state of
anxiety could be isolated without the complications of pathology
or trait variable that may or may not index the state of interest.
Further, the parametric nature of the design afforded the detec-
tion of different impairment patterns in spatial versus verbal WM
across levels of cognitive load, an effect that is novel and one that
holds important theoretical implications.
Limitations of the study included the type of stimuli used, the
lack of a direct measure of anxious apprehension, and the use of
a healthy sample. The stimuli used in the verbal and spatial tasks
were not identical, as those in some previous studies were (Lavric
et al., 2003; Shackman et al., 2006), which could account for a
portion of the variability in performance between the two tasks
and could introduce uncertainty in the strategies used (verbal or
spatial) in each task. However, (1) the tasks were psychometrically
1However, it is important to note that comorbidity across different inter-
nalizing disorders suggests that a common construct links them (Watson,
2009).
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matched, suggesting they were similarly susceptible to anxiety-
related disruption, (2) subjects reported using verbal strategies
(e.g., subvocalization) in the verbal task and spatial strategies
(e.g., mentally superimposing visual representations), strategies
that were only successful for the task in which they were used,
suggesting that the tasks successfully tapped verbal and spatial
WM, and (3) by using different stimuli, participants were not
required to switch strategies on the same set of stimuli, possibly
introducing interference effects and changing the nature of the
task. Other task-specific potential limitations include the issue of
equating difficulty between the verbal and spatial tasks in order
to accurately interpret the differential effect on performance. To
address this, we examined baseline (i.e., during safe) performance
and found no difference between verbal and spatial WM tasks.
These findings suggest that task difficulty did not differ between
modalities because cognitive effort and performance accuracy
was equivalent. In addition, we make claims about the presence
of anxious apprehension without presenting a direct measure
of this component. While the Penn State Worry Questionnaire
(Molina and Borkovec, 1994) may be a viable measure, future
studies should also obtain online worry ratings for compari-
son between experimental conditions. Finally, it is important
to note that our sample consisted of healthy individuals, not
anxiety patients, and any conclusions drawn regarding patho-
logical anxiety or clinical interventions should be interpreted
with caution. Although we identified mechanisms of impair-
ment, these mechanisms may be manifested differently in anx-
ious individuals. Future research should include patient samples
to identify and contrast pathological anxiety-related cognitive
impairment.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Previous research has struggled to identify the mechanisms of
cognitive impairment in anxiety, despite the obvious presence of
cognitive disruption in both state and clinical anxiety. Most indi-
viduals have experienced intense apprehension, along with sweaty
palms and heart pounding, that can serve to debilitate them dur-
ing goal-directed behavior such as giving a public speech. Patients
who suffer from social anxiety are crippled when entering a jovial
room full of party-guests, or an important staff meeting at work.
The impact of anxiety on cognition is undeniable. Here we sys-
tematically pinpoint where anxiety disrupts verbal and spatial
WM processes, highlighting the importance of task modality and
cognitive load. In sum, our findings demonstrate that (1) anxiety
disrupts both verbal and spatial WM, (2) that this disruption is
only present in low and medium-load verbal WM, and (3) that
this disruption is present in spatial WM regardless of task dif-
ficulty. We propose that there are separable neural mechanisms
of disruption that arise from competition with two different
components of anxiety (anxious apprehension and priming of
defensive mechanisms), resulting in the aforementioned pattern
of impairment. Future research should investigate the neural
underpinnings of this disruption to verify these mechanisms of
impairment and extend the investigation to patient populations
so that individual differences in anxiety-related impairment can
be evaluated as a potential risk factor in the development of
pathology.
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